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ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with the reasons for the emergence and dominance of
analytic philosophy in America. It closely examines the contents of, and
changing editors at, The Philosophical Review, and provides a perspective on
the contents of other leading philosophy journals. It suggests that analytic
philosophy emerged prior to the 1950s in an environment characterized by a
rich diversity of approaches to philosophy and that it came to dominate
American philosophy at least in part due to its effective promotion by The
Philosophical Review’s editors. Our picture of mid-twentieth-century American
philosophy is different from existing ones, including those according to which
the prominence of analytic philosophy in America was basically a matter of
the natural affinity between American philosophy and analytic philosophy
and those according to which the political climate at the time was hostile
towards non-analytic approaches. Furthermore, our reconstruction suggests a
new perspective on the nature of 1950s analytic philosophy.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 16 September 2016; Revised 12 November 2016; Accepted 14 November
2016
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1. Introduction
The present paper contributes to what can be called the external history of
twentieth-century philosophy. Rather than focusing on how the push and
pull of argumentation affects the spread of philosophical ideas, and without
denying that this push and pull has a role to play in explaining the spread
of such ideas, we consider the influence of journal capture by proponents
of specific approaches to philosophy on journal contents. More specifically,
we describe (Sections 2i and 2ii) the changing contents of The Philosophical
Review (PR) during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. We also contextualize
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(Section 2iii) these changes by looking, in a less detailed way, at the philoso-
phical environment in which they occurred, including at the contents ofMind,
the Journal of Philosophy (JoP) and other philosophy journals over this period.
We then describe (Section 3) the changes in PR’s editors during the 1940s and
try to learn about how these changes influenced the journal’s contents. Finally
(Section 4), we consider how the emerging picture contributes to our under-
standing of the history of American philosophy and of the nature of mid-
century analytic philosophy.
Our choice of PR as our primary focus was guided by our presumption that
it was among the three most influential journals in the English-speaking world
during the relevant decades, a presumption that is bolstered by which jour-
nals take note of publications in other journals, by the prominence of
authors in journal editions, by the prominence of journal editors and by
reports of journal reputation at the time (see, e.g., Edgar S. Brightman’s
survey of American philosophy during the Second World War (‘Philosophy
in the United States 1939–1945’)).1 The other two journals that shared PR’s
top three status were Mind and JoP.
In order to track the changes in the contents of PR, we classified its articles
using classifications of approaches to philosophy that were provided in survey
and methodological articles in PR during the relevant period. What we found
is a journal that published work exhibiting a wide variety of approaches to
philosophy (e.g. classical pragmatism, process philosophy, idealism, non-
Western philosophy) and that did so until about 1948, when mid-century ana-
lytic philosophy comes to dominate the journal.
The speed of the shift at PR, along with the absence of a similar, simul-
taneous shift in other publication venues, strongly suggests that its immediate
cause is a change in editorial policy. This is confirmed by looking at the
changes in the philosophy faculty at the Susan Linn Sage School of Philosophy
at Cornell University, the school from which PR’s editors were drawn during
the period being considered. Our examination of the changes at Cornell,
along with a consideration of the broader context in which philosophy in
America was done in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, allows us further to conclude
that the changes in editorial policy are not themselves primarily the result of
the changing political climate in America or the passing away of rival
approaches to philosophy. What appears to be more central to the changes
is the replacement of editors who were open to a wide variety of approaches
to philosophy – that is, who adopted what we will call ‘philosophical pluralism’
– by editors without pluralist approaches to philosophy, a replacement that
may have been helped by the pluralism of the first of these groups.
Our reconstruction of the developments in PR, of the context in which
these occur and of their effects, suggests a history of mid-twentieth-century
1Our naming convention is to use first names only when first introducing someone.
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American philosophy that, in one or more respects and in various degrees, is
different from existing ones (Schneider, A History of American Philosophy;
Robinson, ‘Philosophy for the Atomic Age’; Skorupski, History of Western Phil-
osophy; Baldwin, Contemporary Philosophy; McCumber, Time in the Ditch;
Kuklick, History of Philosophy in America; Thomas, Contemporary Philosophy;
Villemaire, E. A. Burtt, Historian and Philosopher; Reisch, How Cold War Trans-
formed; Kuklick, ‘Philosophy and Inclusion in the United States’; Soames, ‘Ana-
lytic Philosophy in America’; Isaac, ‘Missing Links’; Beaney, ‘Historiography of
Analytic Philosophy’; Misak, The American Pragmatists). It suggests that ana-
lytic philosophy emerged in America at a time characterized by philosophical
pluralism and a widespread commitment to addressing meta-philosophical
issues related to such pluralism. It also suggests that analytic philosophy
came to dominate American philosophy partly by analytical philosophers
taking control of key institutions within academic philosophy and using
these to promote analytic philosophy, and that crucial steps in the direction
of such control occurred before 1950. The reason for the growing dominance
of analytic philosophy appears to have been, at least in part, the suppression,
by institutional means, of existing diversity and, possibly, the exploitation of
American pluralism. The dominance of analytic philosophy was not just a
matter of an inherent affinity of American philosophy for analytic philosophy,
good arguments, more cogently stated doctrines or the lack of alternatives.
Nor, at least in its initial stages, is the emergence of analytic philosophy in
America a matter of political climate. Finally, the centrality of the exclusion,
at an institutional level, of alternatives to mid-century analytic philosophy
suggests that the latter might partly be defined by such exclusion.
2. The Philosophical Review: 1930–60
2.1. 1930–48: pluralism
The most fundamental distinction philosophers writing in PR make about
approaches to philosophy in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s is the distinction
between speculative and critical philosophy (see, e.g., Conger, ‘Method and
Content in Philosophy’; Murphy, ‘Ideals and Ideologies’; de Laguna, ‘Speculat-
ive Philosophy’; Frankena, ‘Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century’). The distinction
is, as these authors understood it, roughly as follows: speculative philosophy
tends to focus on the provision of substantial, broad claims about the natures
of the universe and humanity. Critical philosophy, by contrast, tends to try to
limit its substantive, philosophical commitments and spends much of its time
criticizing speculative philosophy or making explicit/reconstructing existing
scientific or common-sense knowledge. Not unrelated, the approaches associ-
ated with critical philosophers are those of epistemological, linguistic or
logical analysis, the latter of which includes rational reconstruction. In the
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speculative philosophy camp, PR’s writers place Absolute idealism, classical –
including Deweyan – pragmatism, (some variants of) neo-Kantianism, specu-
lative forms of realism such as Thomism, process philosophy, phenomenology
and more. In the critical camp, we find new and critical realism, (logical) positiv-
ism and early analytic philosophy, that is, various forms of linguistic philosophy
that flourished during the first 50 or so years of the twentieth century and that
were in the tradition of George E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgen-
stein. Mid-century analytic philosophy is also a form of critical philosophy; it
draws primarily from positivism, critical and new realism, and the closely
allied early analytic philosophy, but is also influenced by pragmatism.
The distinction between speculative and critical philosophy extends to
ethics. According to William K. Frankena (‘Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century’,
44–5), speculative philosophers tend to rely on metaphysics in justifying
their ethics and, further, tend to be normative or practical in their ethics; by
contrast, critical philosophers are concerned primarily with linguistic analysis
of ethical claims and avoid, or tend to avoid, making normative claims. Simi-
larly, Brightman (‘Philosophy in the United States 1939–1945’) emphasizes
that, for speculative philosophers, there can be no gap between philosophical
contemplation and action.
Looking at the overall contents of PR in the 1930s and 1940s indicates that
the speculative tendency to make substantive claims and the critical tendency
to avoid doing so corresponds well with the above classification of philosophi-
cal approaches into speculative and critical ones. Of importance to what
follows, Deweyian pragmatism counts as speculative. Grace A. de Laguna
(‘Speculative Philosophy’, 15–16) argues for the speculative status of
Dewey’s work by noting the similarity of Dewey’s metaphysics to Peirce’s
speculative metaphysics. Dewey confirms her perspective in the pages of
PR (‘Whitehead’s Philosophy’) when he endorses a variant of Alfred
N. Whitehead’s speculative approach. David W. Prall (‘Knowledge as Aptness
of Body’), who is close to Dewey in approach, exemplifies the speculative phi-
losopher’s tendency to link philosophical speculation and practice.
What is remarkable about the content of PR in the 1930s and through until
about 1948 is not just that it includes substantial representation of all the
approaches to philosophy mentioned in the last three paragraphs, but that
it includes much material that is – beyond its classification as either speculat-
ive or critical – hard to classify even given the long list of approaches above.
Thus, alongside the already cited work in classical pragmatism, one finds
positivist contributions, such as those by Moritz Schlick (‘Meaning and Verifi-
cation’) and A. Cornelius Benjamin (‘Types of Empiricism’). But one also finds
work that combines classical pragmatism and positivism, for example, the
work of Charles W. Morris (‘Peirce, Mead and Pragmatism’).
Perhaps more interestingly, while PR includes work that is paradigmatically
speculative (e.g. work by Whitehead, ‘Objects and Subjects’) and work that is
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paradigmatically critical (e.g. the work by the already mentioned Schlick), it
also includes work that aims to develop forms of speculative philosophy
that incorporate critical approaches to philosophy in novel ways. Arthur
E. Murphy (‘Can Speculative Philosophy Be Defended?’; ‘Ideals and Ideologies’),
for example, proposes that philosophers should busy themselves with provid-
ing speculative frameworks for science but that the generality of these frame-
works be limited to individual domains within science, for example, to biology,
and thus should be much more limited than was standard in speculative phil-
osophy. On his view, it is the job of critical philosophy to determine how to
circumscribe the application of speculative philosophical frameworks.
One also finds more individualistic philosophical approaches in PR. Thus,
Katherine Gilbert engages closely with poetry in arguing that philosophy
can learn from poetry about the relationship between language and
thought as well as about how different parts of language interrelate
(‘Recent Poets on Man and His Place’). De Laguna’s justification of democracy
(‘Democratic Equality and Individuality’) has Neo-Kantian anthropological
philosophy as an important source, but also draws on British, Hegelian ideal-
ism and George H. Mead’s pragmatism. George W. Hartmann (‘The Strength
and Weakness’) offers an early example of experimental philosophy when
he aims to advance the discussion of pacifism by surveying American philoso-
phers about their views and arguments on the matter.
This diversity of approaches to philosophy becomes particularly noticeable
in the 1940s, when many papers on philosophical methodology appear in the
journal. In these papers, the goal tends not to be to find some justification for
existing approaches to philosophy. Rather, the goal is to forge new approaches
to philosophy. Murphy’s work, already mentioned, is a case in point. Another is
work by Daniel S. Robinson. Robinson (‘Philosophy for the Atomic Age’)
declares that pragmatism, idealism, realism, positivism and scientifically
engaged speculative philosophies such as Whitehead’s process philosophy
were all obsolete by the end of the Second World War. According to Robinson,
what is called for is a new philosophy for the Atomic Age. The approach Robin-
son starts to develop in his paper is hard to buttonhole, but is reminiscent of
European phenomenology in the way it is willing to reconceptualize familiar
experience and is, at the same time, different from European phenomenology
in the philosophical and cultural background it explicitly draws on.
Edwin A. Burtt takes things further (‘The Problem of Philosophic Method’) by
arguing for a philosophical approach that somehow allows for, or incorporates,
all existing philosophical approaches and is not dogmatic about philosophical
approaches. Indeed, Burtt’s pluralism extends beyond approaches in Western
Philosophy, as he makes clear in his ‘How Can the Philosophies of East and
West Meet’. Conger (‘Method and Content in Philosophy’) is another philoso-
pher who defends a similar form of pluralism in the pages of PR.
776 J. KATZAV AND K. VAESEN
During the 1930s and 1940s, PR also provides regular surveys of the state-of-
the-art in French and German philosophy, though the surveys of the latter stop
abruptly, and unsurprisingly, in 1938. In 1948 the journal publishes (Vol. 57(6)) a
symposium on Oriental philosophy where authors from India, China and
America discuss the relationship between Western, Indian and Chinese philos-
ophy. It is in this context that Burtt’s paper about the philosophies of East and
West is published. Indian philosophers writing in India publish full-length
papers in PR throughout the period we have been discussing (see, e.g. Sircar,
‘Reality in Indian Thought’; Srinivasa Iyengar, ‘The Notion of Dependence’;
Raju, ‘The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions’).
A further role of PR during the period under consideration was the publi-
cation of proceedings and presidential addresses of the American Philosophi-
cal Association (APA). The addresses that were published fit comfortably into
the regular output of the journal. In particular, the addresses are diverse in
their contents, much as PR is.
As for specializations within philosophy, these are broadly represented in
the journal. It includes the history of Western philosophy – ancient, Medieval
and modern – ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, philosophy of language,
philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, phil-
osophy of economics, philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of
religion, philosophy of education and more.
The ethics in PR includes reflection on the nature and epistemology of
ethical claims, but also normative ethics. The contributions to normative
ethics regularly aim to address what were then current concerns and are
often informed by psychology, sociology and the metaphysics of society
and of humans. One prominent concern is the role of philosophy in society
and, in particular, in American education, following the social changes
America was undergoing as a result of war and of the revolutions in
science. Thus, for example, 1945 sees a special edition (54(3)) that collects
the opinions of American philosophers on the role of a liberal education.
Another prominent concern is the nature and justification of democracy
along with the challenges posed by non-democratic forms of government
that threatened it, including the increasing corporatization of American
society. De Laguna’s already mentioned (‘Democratic Equality and Individual-
ity’) attempt to provide a philosophical justification for democracy, for
example, rests on an empirically informed metaphysics of humans and their
relations to society, and delivers claims about inherent problems that are sup-
posed to exist in societies where democracy is limited. (Other examples of
socially relevant instances of speculative philosophy in PR include Sisson
(‘Human Nature and the Present Crisis’), Gurvitch (‘Is the Antithesis of ‘Moral
Man’ and ‘Immoral Society’ True?’) and Spiegelberg (‘A Defense of Human
Equality’).)
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2.2. 1948–60: a sudden shift
The transition from the diverse philosophical content of PR just described was
quick and started in 1948 with a number of issues in which analytic philos-
ophy uncharacteristically takes centre stage. Vol. 57(3) came out in May. It
starts with an Introduction by Max Black, one celebrating the translation of
Gottlob Frege’s ‘Sense and Reference’, followed by the translation. The
remaining articles and discussions of 57(3) are best characterized as critical
philosophy, more specifically, mid-century analytic philosophy; indeed, the
term ‘analytic(al) philosophy’ first becomes widespread in PR during this
period. The next two issues of Vol. 57 are largely the same, with 57(4)
having Hans Reichenbach’s ‘Rationalism and Empiricism: An Inquiry into the
Roots of Philosophical Error’ as a centrepiece. The remaining part of Vol. 57
harks back to the older PR; 57(6) contains the work from the already men-
tioned symposium on Oriental Philosophy, along with the last full-length
papers in modern Indian philosophy in the journal until at least 2015. The
first part of the 1949 volume, 58(1), contains the work from a symposium
on the relationship between logic and metaphysics, work that includes critical
and speculative contributions. 58(1) also contains the last instalment of the
regular review of French philosophy, one which reviews French Philosophy
in the years 1946–7. With the exception of 58(5), the remaining five parts of
Vol. 58 are dominated by mid-century analytic philosophy. This volume
includes prominent analytic philosophers such as Ernest Nagel, Oets
K. Bouwsma, Norman Malcolm and Arthur Pap. The papers in 58(5) are specu-
lative papers; these papers are the 1948 through to April 1949 addresses to
the APA and comprise the last addresses of the APA to be published in PR.
Throughout the 1950s, the journal is strongly dominated by mid-century
analytic philosophy and the history of Western philosophy. During 1950–5,
for example, roughly 65% of the full-length papers in the journal are mid-
century analytic, roughly 25% are historical and roughly 10% (9 papers) can
be classified as speculative; during the years 1944–7, by contrast, roughly
30% of the papers can be classified as critical, including positivist, realist
and (early) analytical, roughly 20% as historical and roughly 50% as speculat-
ive (see Appendix 1). The shift in PR’s contents appears to be not only away
from speculative philosophy but also within critical philosophy. At this time,
the term ‘mid-century analytic philosophy’ does come to seem to be an
appropriate umbrella term that covers almost all of the critical philosophy
in the journal.
Ethics in 1950s PR is also, by and large, analytic ethics. It does include meta-
ethics and normative ethics. However, the focus of normative ethics is not
current social concerns but, rather, issues such as whether to prefer utilitarian-
ism or its rivals. Moreover, the tendency is to avoid using speculative claims in
order to inform one’s ethics. John Rawls’s work in PR is illustrative of the spirit
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with which normative issues are addressed in PR. He is explicit that his claim
that justice should be thought of as fairness does not rest on substantive
claims about human nature; his claim results from a conceptual analysis of
what, as far as common sense is concerned, justice involves and does not
address the question whether the conditions in which questions of justice
arise are ever realized (‘Justice as Fairness’, 175–6). Rawls’s other contributions
to PR in the 1950s (‘Outline of a Decision Procedure’; ‘Two Concepts of Rules’)
also aim to be non-speculative and make little by way of actual normative
claims.
The isolated, post-1949 contributions by speculative philosophers include,
among others, contributions by de Laguna (‘Speculative Philosophy’; ‘Exist-
ence and Potentiality’), Murphy (‘Ambiguity in Professor Simon’s Philosophy’),
George S. Sabine (‘The Two Democratic Traditions’), Burtt (‘Generic Definition
of Philosophic Terms’) and Charles Hartshorne (‘Causal Necessities’). In some
cases, the contributions by speculative philosophers make very clear conces-
sions to analytic philosophy in their content; thus, for example, Burtt discusses
(‘Generic Definition of Philosophic Terms’) a non-speculative aspect of his
project of building bridges between different approaches to philosophy,
namely that of clarifying the language used when different approaches to
philosophy engage with each other.
The perspective the journal offers on philosophy in America fits its new
content. Vol. 60(1), which appeared in 1951, includes three articles that
were supposed to describe the main trends in what was then recent philos-
ophy. One is by de Laguna (‘Speculative Philosophy’) and supposedly rep-
resents the whole of speculative philosophy. De Laguna’s article gives scant
place to many of the distinctive approaches found in PR in the 1930s and
1940s, thus helping to write them, and herself, out of history. Indeed, all
but one of the figures she focuses on – Martin Heidegger – are dead by the
end of 1952. Her survey presents the ideas of René Descartes, Immanuel
Kant, Georg F. Hegel and analytic philosophy as background to twentieth-
century speculative philosophy and then discusses the work of Henri-Louis
Bergson, George Santayana, Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, Charles Saunders
Peirce and Dewey. Her discussion culminates in a discussion of Whitehead’s
speculative philosophy, a philosophy which, she says, is second to none.
Whitehead is a figure who is central to pre-1949 PR but whose presence is
insubstantial in the journal in the 1950s. A second article covers critical phil-
osophy; the article is by Willard V. O. Quine (‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’).
This article focuses on Quine’s ideas as well as on those of Rudolf Carnap,
thus placing the work of these two at the centre of the discussion of mid-
century analytic philosophy. A third article, written by the analytic philosopher
Frankena (‘Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century’), covers moral philosophy that
was recent in 1951. Frankena tells us that moral philosophy has shifted
towards analytic ethics and as a result is, aside from a resurgence of
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theological ethics, no longer speculative. He also writes that, with the shift to
analytic moral philosophy, moral philosophy has become less normative and
is basically only published in articles (‘Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century’, 44–
45, 55). Frankena’s focus is, accordingly and despite his acknowledgment
that analytic ethics will have to become more speculative and should be
more normative, just on analytic ethics. This focus is misleading. Our discus-
sion of the pre-1948 contents of PR indicates that Frankena is correct about
the content of analytic ethics, but also that speculative ethics is alive and
well at the time. Indeed, even the few speculative papers PR continues to
publish in the 1950s include moral philosophy (see, e.g. Murphy, ‘Ambiguity
in Professor Simon’s Philosophy’; Sabine, ‘The Two Democratic Traditions’).
In addition, the citations in Brightman (‘Philosophy in the United States
1939–1945’) show that American value theory and social philosophy, along
with its treatment of theoretical and practical issues relating to justice, are
doing well during the war both in and out of book form.
In 1952, a year after PR publishes its perspective on recent philosophy, its
editors celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the journal with the following
notice:
‘The scope of the REVIEW,’ wrote Schurman in a prefatory note to the first
number, ‘will be as wide as philosophy in its broadest sense.’ In their selection
of papers for publication, the editors will continue to ensure that the REVIEW
remains, as Schurman intended, ‘a free organ of general philosophy,’ and not
the instrument ‘of any institution, or of any sect, or of any interest’.
(PR, Vol. 61(4), p. 450)
To be clear, while PR was, prior to 1948, methodologically diverse, it was not
pluralistic in every respect. It did not, largely due to the influence of the jour-
nal’s founder James E. Creighton (Auxier, ‘Creighton, James Edwin’), include
many contributions from non-philosophers. So too, philosophers from some
universities, especially philosophers from Cornell, do seem to be dispropor-
tionately represented in the pages of the journal, something that continues
in the 1950s. Women have some representation in the journal (e.g. in
addition to work by the already mentioned de Laguna and Gilbert, we
find work by Alice Ambrose (‘A Controversy in the Logic of Mathematics’)
and Hazel E. Barnes (‘Neo-Platonism and Analytical Psychology’)), but they
are a small minority. And so on. We cannot, accordingly, identify the plural-
ism we have been discussing with the philosophical pluralism espoused by
some American philosophers in the 1960s and 1970s; the latter pluralism
was concerned with more than methodology (Kuklick, ‘Philosophy and
Inclusion in the United States’). PR after the takeover was a narrow journal,
but it also allowed for some diversity. In particular, the influence of pragma-
tism was present in the journal through the work of philosophers like Quine
and Clarence I. Lewis.
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2.3. Context and effects of changes at The Philosophical Review
The literature already documents how, by mid-twentieth century, work in
Mind was dominated by mid-century analytic philosophy (Warnock, ‘Gilbert
Ryle’s Editorship’; Hamlyn, ‘Gilbert Ryle and Mind’). JoP was, in the 1950s,
still open to classical pragmatism in a way that PR no longer was, although
pragmatism and mid-century analytic philosophy did account for the bulk
of JoP’s content. The changes in PR’s content thus meant that, by 1950,
only one of the three most influential philosophy journals in America and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain provided real space for speculative phil-
osophy, and the journal that did provide such space provided it predomi-
nantly to pragmatism.
Non-pragmatist speculative philosophy still had destinations in the 1950s,
even if less prestigious ones than Mind, PR and JoP. The Review of Metaphysics
provided additional room for speculative and analytic philosophy (it was
founded in 1947 by Paul Weiss (Castiglione, ‘Weiss, Paul’) and we cannot
but speculate about whether this was tied to the changes in PR). Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, which was founded in 1940, provided a
home for phenomenology throughout the 1950s, though it also published
pragmatist work and other speculative philosophy; it also published mid-
century analytic philosophy. The journal Philosophy of Science was still a
decade away from its disengagement from social concerns and pragmatism
(Don Howard, ‘Two Left Turns Make a Right’). Although the addresses of the
APA are no longer published in PR after 1949, they are published by the
APA and continue to be diverse in their content. Thus, for example, Albert
E. Avey’s address (‘Truth and Falsehood, Mostly Falsehood’) is pragmatist,
Richard McKeon’s address (‘Symposia’) is historical, Georgina Melvin’s
address (‘The Legal Norm in Soviet Jurisprudence’) is a specialist paper on
Soviet Jurisprudence that does not clearly belong to any particular school
of philosophy and John H. Randall, Jr. makes a case for pluralism in philosophy
(‘Talking and Looking’).
Given the influence of PR, JoP and Mind, it is plausible to suppose that they
had a role in influencing the approaches and views, as well as the job pro-
spects, of young academic philosophers in America at the time. Plausibly,
the journals pushed young academics in the analytic direction, away from
methodological pluralism. This effect is plausibly thought to have been
strengthened by the substantial increase in the numbers of American stu-
dents of philosophy going on to be academic philosophers during the
period starting at the end of the Second World War through until the 1970s
(see Soames, ‘Analytic Philosophy in America’ for some indication of the
numbers involved).
One thing the shift in PR’s editorial policy did not do, however, is to relieve
built up demand for space by young analytic philosophers. They were not
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waiting in the wings. Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950, but had very
thin volumes in its early years. Moreover, the analytic contributors to PR in the
late 1940s and early 1950s were not junior scholars, with the exception of
John Ladd (vol. 60(1)) and Rawls (vol. 60(2)). So, in addition to the contri-
butions mentioned above, one finds papers by authors who had already
studied with Moore and Wittgenstein in the 1930s or earlier, authors such
as Ambrose (Schrader, ‘Lazerowitz, Alice Loman Ambrose’), Malcolm (Blair,
‘Malcolm, Norman Adrian’), Charles L. Stevenson (Frankena, ‘Memorial
Minutes’) and Margaret MacDonald (Waither, A History of Women
Philosophers).
In addition, the move away from a pluralistic journal and from debates
about how to address different approaches to philosophy does not bring
PR in line with the real approaches and concerns of American philosophers.
With regard to their approaches, the diversity in the contents of pre-1948
PR reflects the diversity among American philosophers, as is documented
by authors writing at the time (see, e.g. Brightman, ‘Philosophy in the
United States 1939–1945’; Schneider, A History of American Philosophy) and
by more recent authors (see, e.g. Isaac, ‘Missing Links’). With regard to the con-
cerns of American philosophers, Brightman (‘Philosophy in the United States
1939–1945’, 404), Brand Blanshard (‘Climate of Opinion’) and the persistence
of the discussion of methodological pluralism over time and in different jour-
nals (see, e.g. the papers by Marjorie Glicksman (‘Relativism and Philosophic
Methods’), Rupert C. Lodge (‘Balanced Philosophy and Eclecticism’) and
McKeon (‘Philosophy and Method’) in JoP) all indicate that the issue of decid-
ing between different approaches to philosophy was a central issue in Amer-
ican philosophy during and after the Second World War, with many authors
supporting pluralism. Neill Gross (Richard Rorty, ch. 5) and Bruce Kuklick (‘Phil-
osophy at Yale’) provide further support for our conclusion; they note the
explicit endorsement of pluralism emerging at Yale in the 1930s and 1940s,
a period when Harvard comes to be dominated by critical philosophy.
3. The Philosophical Review’s takeover: proximate causes
There is still the question of what caused the sudden shift in the contents of
PR. The speed of the shift, along with the continued flourishing of speculative
philosophy outside of the pages of PR, suggests that editorial changes were its
proximate causes. The suspicion is confirmed by taking a look at the changes
in the editorship of PR in the late 1940s.
As we have noted, PR’s editors were, in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, drawn
from the Sage School of Philosophy. Moreover, as Diane Villemaire makes
clear (E. A. Burtt, Historian and Philosopher, 78), the School was a major
centre of American speculative thought in 1945 but had become, by 1953,
the strongest analytic department in America. At some point in the
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intervening period, then, control of PR’s content is taken over by philosophers
who actively favoured mid-century analytic philosophy.
A closer look at the changes at the School indicates that the shift in control
is likely to have taken place in 1947 or 1948, precisely the period during which
we have seen that PR’s pluralism is dying out. Murphy joins the School in 1945
and serves as Chair of the School from 1946 until 1953 (Brogan, Doty and
Ginascole, ‘In Memorium Arthur Edward Murphy’). He initiates a series of
hires that include prominent proponents of analytic philosophy, namely
Black and Malcolm (Villemaire, E. A. Burtt, Historian and Philosopher, 78). The
hires also include Gregory Vlastos. Although Vlastos was a historian of philos-
ophy, his approach to history included in its credentials the strong influence of
Black and Malcolm (Shoemaker and Pereboom ‘History of the Susan Linn Sage
School of Philosophy’). Black is hired in 1946, Malcolm in 1947 and Vlastos in
1948 (Shoemaker and Pereboom, ‘History of the Susan Linn Sage School of
Philosophy’). Two other, less prominent hires were Stuart M. Brown, hired in
1946 (Kretzmann et al., ‘Stuart M. Brown, Jr’), and William Doney, hired in
1949 (Dartmouth News, ‘In Memoriam’). Brown worked in the tradition of lin-
guistic analysis (see, e.g. Brown, ‘Inalienable Rights’) and Doney was a historian
of modern philosophy (Dartmouth News, ‘In Memoriam’). Both appeared to be
under the influence of Wittgenstein when he visited Cornell in 1949 (Pinch
and Swedberg, ‘Wittgenstein’s visit to Ithaca in 1949’). Watts Cunningham
and Sabine, both longstanding PR editors and appropriately described as
speculative philosophers (see the references to Sabine above and below,
and Watts Cunningham’s self-identification as an Absolute idealist (‘How Far
to the Land of Yoga?’)), retired in 1948 and 1949, respectively (Black, Brown
and Burtt, ‘Gustavus Watts Cunningham’; Brown, Marcham and Konvitz,
‘George Harold Sabine’, respectively). Presumably this, at least, diminished
their influence on journal contents even though they continued to be
named as journal editors immediately after their retirement. In any case, it
seems that, by 1949, those philosophers who had been at the School prior
to Murphy’s arrival – including not only Watts Cunningham and Sabine, but
also the already discussed Burtt and the speculative philosopher of logic
and science Harold R. Smart (see his ‘Professor Pratt on Speculative Philos-
ophy’ and ‘Bolzano’s Logic’) – had limited influence on the School (Villemaire,
E. A. Burtt, Historian and Philosopher, Pinch and Swedberg, ‘Wittgenstein’s visit
to Ithaca in 1949’). Richard Robinson, who did analytic philosophy (see, e.g.
Robinson, ‘Ambiguity’), was at the school prior to Murphy’s arrival but left
in 1946 (Appendix 2 includes an overview of the changes in PR’s editors).
PR’s editors make use of external editorial consultants during most of the
period we are concerned with here. Looking at the changes in those who
serve as such consultants is also illuminating. PR’s front matter indicates
that, in the years 1936–8, the consultants included Étienne Gilson, William
A. Hammond, Nicolai Hartmann, Arthur Liebert and Arthur E. Taylor. Gilson
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was a Paris-based historian of medieval philosophy and Thomist (Murphy, Art
and Intellect in the Philosophy of Étienne Gilson). Hammond, who was at the
Sage School until his retirement in 1930 and then moved to Washington,
worked on ancient philosophy and aesthetics (Cornell University, ‘William
Alexander Hammond’). Taylor was an ethical theist with a British idealist
past who was located in Edinburgh (Mander, British Idealism, 87), Hartmann
a realist with speculative tendencies who was located in Berlin (Peterson,
‘Nicolai Hartmann’s Philosophy of Nature’) and Liebert a Neo-Kantian
located in Prague (Moran, Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Trans-
cendental Phenomenology, 2–3). The number of consultants diminishes sub-
stantially during the war years, with only Gilson and Taylor being mentioned
in the front matter. No editorial consultants are mentioned between 1946
and 1950. However, in 1950, a long list of new consultants appear: Henry
D. Aiken, Virgil C. Aldrich, Charles A. Baylis, George Boas, Cornelius Krusé
and Walter T. Stace. Other than Krusé, who is a speculative philosopher at
Wesleyan University, the list comprises committed analytic philosophers
and a historian of ideas with an analytic penchant. Aiken was committed
to ordinary language philosophy (Moreno-Davis, ‘Aiken, Henry David
(1912–82)’); Aldrich and Stace were, according to Beaney (‘The Historiogra-
phy of Analytic Philosophy’, 45), made part of the analytic canon when
their work was published in 1949 in Readings in Philosophical Analysis
(edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars) alongside work by Quine,
Frege, Russell and Carnap2; Baylis (‘The Practice of Philosophy’, Susanne K.
Langer) takes Susanne K. Langer to share his view that philosophy is
logical analysis and, unlike science, not concerned with the connection of
facts, but nevertheless cannot resist promoting the view in reviewing her
work; as for Boas, he primarily works in the history of ideas (Gombrich, ‘In
Memory of George Boas’), but what philosophy he published in the early
1950s bears the clear stamp of ordinary language philosophy along with nat-
uralistic features (see, e.g. Boas, ‘The Perceptual Element in Cognition’; ‘Being
and Existence’).
An important complication for our story thus far is that, as we have noted,
Murphy was not an analytic philosopher. However, his willingness to hire ana-
lytic philosophers, and perhaps to assist in PR’s transition3, might partly be
explained by his already mentioned commitment to synthesizing critical
and speculative approaches. It is also possible that the commitment to meth-
odological pluralism by Cunningham (Black, Brown and Burtt, ‘Gustavus Watts
2Stace writes (Mysticism and Philosophy, 6) that his ‘approach to philosophy is that of an empiricist and an
analyst’ and traces his methodology back to Moore. Thus, while he is concerned to uncover the nature of
reality, the truths he aims to uncover are supposed to result from an analysis of available knowledge.
Moreover, in this way, he shares the critical philosopher’s tendency to avoid substantive philosophical
commitments.
3PR’s front matter has Murphy as chief editor from 1950 until he leaves Cornell in 1953.
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Cunningham’) and Burtt contributed to limiting the extent to which they
resisted the changes Murphy introduced. Part of the explanation of why
some speculative philosophers were still publishing in PR in the 1950s
might be their location at Cornell. The reader may have noticed that Burtt,
Murphy and Sabine were among these speculative philosophers.
4. Revisiting the history of philosophy in America
There are, as we noted in the introduction, a variety of pictures of the emer-
gence of analytic philosophy in America. In what follows, we focus primarily
on representative proponents of two kinds of pictures of this emergence.
On the one hand, we contrast our picture with the (more or less purely intern-
alist) ones provided by Scott Soames (‘Analytic Philosophy in America’) and
Cheryl Misak (The American Pragmatists). Soames and Misak represent
accounts according to which the philosophical merits of analytic philosophy
and the welcoming, or at least compliant, nature of pre-1950s American phil-
osophy facilitate the growth of mid-century analytic philosophy in America
(related accounts are found in Kuklick (‘Philosophy and Inclusion in the
United States’), Isaac (‘Missing Links’) and Beaney (‘The Historiography of Ana-
lytic Philosophy’)). On the other hand, we contrast our picture with the kind of
(externalist) one provided by John McCumber (Time in the Ditch). McCumber
here represents accounts according to which country-wide political forces
serve to mould mid-century analytic philosophy (a related account is provided
by Reisch (How Cold War Transformed)).
Soames (‘Analytic Philosophy in America’) tells us that tendencies in Amer-
ican philosophy prior to the emergence of American analytic philosophy in
the 1950s and 1960s already included those characteristic of analytic philos-
ophy. These tendencies included
belief in the relevance of logic and language for philosophy, emphasis on pre-
cision and clarity of argumentation, suspicion of apriori metaphysics, and
elevation of the goals of truth and knowledge over inspiration, moral uplift,
and spiritual comfort -- plus a dose of professional specialization.
(‘Analytic Philosophy in America’, 453)
Given these tendencies, Soames tells us that
all that was needed for America to enter the stream of analytic philosophy was
for the works of its philosophers to regularly, and in large numbers, enter the
torrent flowing from its British and European sources.
(‘Analytic Philosophy in America’, 454)
Soames goes on to trace how, given the analytic friendly nature of American
philosophy, analytic philosophy eventually triumphs in America. Three factors,
according to Soames, lead above all others to the triumph (‘Analytic Philos-
ophy in America’, 456). These, he writes, are
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(i) the arrival from Europe of leading logicians, philosophers of science, logical
positivists, and other analytic philosophers (ii) the transformation of the
Harvard department led by Quine in the 1950s, and 60s, and (iii) the vast
post-war expansion in higher education in America, which came to encompass
a substantial drain in philosophical talent from Britain to the United States –
including (for varying lengths of time) such figures as Paul Grice, Stuart Hamp-
shire, J. O Urmson, and Philippa Foot.
(‘Analytic Philosophy in America’, 454)
A similar thesis about the emergence of analytic philosophy in America is put
forward by Misak. According to Misak, when the positivists arrived in America,
‘they did not arrive in a land that was inhospitable to their view, nor did they
need to uproot the view they found already planted there’ (The American
Pragmatists, 156). On the contrary, while she recognizes that positivists and
pragmatists had their disagreements, she denies that these were about ‘fun-
damental breaches in philosophical view’ (The American Pragmatists, 175). In
her view, pragmatism and logical positivism flourished together after the
arrival of the latter in America, so much so that the pragmatist epistemology
and theory of truth are dominant in American analytic philosophy from the
1930s through until the 1950s (The American Pragmatists, 156–7).
Misak also addresses the thought that the positivists who influenced mid-
century American analytic philosophers and the analytic philosophers them-
selves were somehow less concerned with normative issues than pragmatists
were and thus that this is where they were divided. She points out, on the con-
trary, that the positivists were concerned with normative issues and, indeed,
believed that by promoting scientific thought, they were working for a socially
progressive world (The American Pragmatists, 168). She adds (The American
Pragmatists, 175), citing Isaac (‘Missing Links’), that the claim that early analytic
philosophy in America repudiated normative issues is dubious.
Contrary to Misak and Soames, however, our examination of PR and other
sources from the 1940s and 1950s shows that mid-century American philoso-
phers correctly recognized that speculative philosophy (including classical
pragmatism) as well as critical philosophy (including analytic philosophy)
stand in opposition. Moreover, we have seen that this recognition served as
a systematic basis for influencing the trajectory of philosophy in America.
Looking at the figures which Misak identifies as pragmatists within the ana-
lytic tradition merely confirms our picture. These philosophers were opposed
to speculative philosophy. Thus, for example, Lewis tells us that it ‘is not the
business of philosophy, as it is of the natural sciences, to add to the sum
total of phenomena with which men are acquainted’ (Mind and the World
Order, 2). Wilfrid Sellars describes himself as working against pragmatism
with the help of the tools of critical realism (Olen, ‘Realist Challenge to Con-
ceptual Pragmatism’) and commits himself (‘Philosophy and the Scientific
Image of Man’, 3) to the view that philosophy does not aim to make a
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substantive contribution to what we know. Nelson Goodman sees himself as
providing Carnapian rational reconstructions of our concepts (The Structure of
Appearance). PR’s choice of Quine as the representative of critical philosophy
makes sense given Quine’s view (Hylton, ‘Willard van Orman Quine’), discern-
ible also in his 1951 contribution to PR, that philosophical investigation of the
nature of the world just amounts to the logical regimentation of our best
scientific theories.
With regard to ethics, we agree with Misak and Isaac that some positivists
were socially engaged, and we have seen that Misak and Isaac are correct that
analytic philosophers of the 1940s and 1950s engage with ethical issues. But,
by 1945, there are no longer any influential, socially engaged positivists
(Kuklick, ‘Modern Anglophone Philosophy’). More importantly, recognizing
that analytic philosophers engage with ethical issues is compatible with
recognizing fundamental differences between the ways in which they and
speculative philosophers do so. Moreover, as we have seen, authors writing
during the period we are concerned with recognize that speculative philoso-
phy’s ethics tends to be, while analytic ethics tends not to be, informed by
metaphysics or other substantive speculative claims. So too, we have seen
that speculative philosophy’s ethics is correctly thought of as being more inti-
mately tied to practice.
What Misak and Soames, as well as others (see, e.g. Baldwin, Contemporary
Philosophy; Skorupski, History of Western Philosophy; Thomas, Contemporary
Philosophy; Kuklick, ‘Philosophy and Inclusion in the United States’), also
miss is not just the variety of approaches to philosophy in America at the
time – which we have seen Isaac (‘Missing Links’) recognizes – but the open-
ness of PR and other journals, and of many in the community they served, to
such a variety. This methodological pluralism gives rise to further theoretical
and practical tensions between some speculative philosophers and some ana-
lytic philosophers, tensions that manifest themselves in the changing con-
tents of PR.
It thus seems that there is real tension between much philosophy in
America, including classical pragmatism, on the one hand, and mid-century
analytic philosophy and positivism on the other. This tension arises from fun-
damental disagreements about philosophical approach and is there even if
Misak and Soames are correct about what analytic philosophers and positi-
vists shared with many non-analytic American philosophers.
The failure to acknowledge the deep divisions between different
approaches to philosophy in America leads, in turn, to a failure to see the
variety of directions in which American philosophy might have developed.
Pragmatism and analytic philosophy were but two approaches among
many approaches in America; variants of speculative philosophy, for
example, Whitehead’s process philosophy, varieties of pluralism, attempted
syntheses between speculative and critical philosophy, and more were
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available. Whether or not developing these approaches beyond the way in
which they were developed would have been a good thing – and we take
no stand on this issue here – they all had substantial room for further
development.
Soames also, and in this too he is not alone (see, e.g. Kuklick (‘Philosophy
and Inclusion in the United States, 1929–2001’), Isaac (‘Missing Links’) and
Beaney (‘The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy’)), tells a substantially
incomplete story about how post-Second World War, analytic philosophy
came to dominate American philosophy. The migration of the very small
number of logical positivists to America aside, Soames’s story takes place
after 1950. Beaney (‘The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy’) provides a
more complete picture, one on which increased interaction between British
and American philosophy after the war, along with key publications, at the
end of the 1940s and during the 1950s, jointly give shape to analytic philos-
ophy. Beaney further observes, in agreement with our observation regarding
the use of the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in PR, that this term only came to be
widely used in the 1950s. Our story, however, suggests that control of key
journals prior to 1950 played an important role in the growth of analytic phil-
osophy. The speed of the shift in PR’s contents, along with the deliberate
choice of the contents, further suggests that the involved individuals had a
very clear view of what was, and what was not, analytic philosophy and
thus that much of the identity it presented in the 1950s was already well-
formed in the mid-1940s. At least from the perspective of our story, analytic
philosophy’s triumph appears more akin to a premeditated, hostile takeover
by key American and European players, than to the settling of foreign
friends on philosophically unoccupied land or, though this no doubt also
occurred, to the ongoing moulding of a discipline through discussion
among like-minded thinkers.
Finally, while Soames is correct that the post-war expansion in numbers of
philosophers helps to explain the availability of jobs in America for British phi-
losophers, it does not, given the tensions we have noted and given the avail-
able alternatives to analytic philosophy, explain why so many of the new
American recruits to philosophy picked analytic philosophy. In this context,
one should keep in mind not only the very small number of logical positivists
who moved to America but that proponents of other approaches to philos-
ophy had also arrived on its shores, including phenomenologists, existential-
ists, Neo-Kantians and critical theorists.
Overall, then, the supposed affinity of pragmatism, positivism and analytic
philosophy cannot explain how analytic philosophy came to be dominant in
America. An appeal to this affinity fails to recognize all the relevant
approaches to philosophy in America, the tensions between speculative
and critical approaches, and is contrary to the use of marginalization in the
process. On the other hand, the beginnings of an explanation of this
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marginalization and, as a result, of the shift in American philosophical alle-
giances in the 1950s can be found in the pluralism of many American philo-
sophers with regard to philosophical approach, PR’s takeover by philosophers
who were not pluralists about philosophical approach, the occurrence of this
takeover at the onset of substantial growth in American academic philosophy,
and the limited availability of alternatives to PR that were similar to it in pres-
tige and were welcoming to speculative philosophy.
McCumber (Time in the Ditch) identifies another factor that might help to
explain the emergence of analytic philosophy in America, namely McCarthy-
ism. McCumber argues that academic philosophers suffered disproportio-
nately from McCarthyite forces and, at the same time, were prominent in
supporting these forces. The attacks suffered by philosophers across
America under McCarthyism, the way the discipline responded to these
attacks and the broader political environment, led, according to McCumber,
to a narrower vision of philosophy, one that focused on linguistic analysis
and, indeed, primarily on the analysis of scientific claims. Along the way,
the relatively socially engaged pragmatists in America suffered precisely
because of their social engagement.
However, note that, as McCumber recognizes, McCarthyism only really
begins to bite around about 1949, a year after the changes in PR commence
and a few years after Murphy starts to change the character of the Sage
School. A second feature of the story we tell is that it is in many ways local.
Murphy’s acquisition by the School, the simultaneous retirement of Watts
Cunningham and Sabine, the fact that PR was located at the School and
that the new hires included the individuals it included are all local causes of
the changes at PR and do not appear to result from contextual features of
the situation. It thus seems unlikely that McCarthyism played an important
role in changing PR. Instead, it seems that academic philosophy in America
was already well on the way to changing through initiatives that were internal
to it.
The above does not, of course, exclude supposing that PR’s promotion of a
relatively narrow vision of philosophy in the 1950s contributed to the flourish-
ing of academic philosophy then and later. Possibly, things would have been
tougher for philosophy had PR in the 1950s remained pluralistic in the way it
was in earlier years. In this context, it is worth noting that the only paper we
have found in PR that dates from 1950 to 1955 and that appears to criticize
McCarthyism, even if only obliquely, is by the speculative philosopher
Sabine (‘The Two Democratic Traditions’). The only explicit mention of
McCarthy is in a paper according to which what we are doing in avowals
such as ‘I feel bored’ is not very different from what we are doing when we
make factual claims such as ‘McCarthy is in Washington today’ (Fleming,
‘On Avowals’).
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5. Discussion
Mid-century analytic philosophy represented itself as the champion of clear
thinking and rigorous argumentation (Soames, ‘Analytic Philosophy in
America’). It is interesting that such an approach to philosophy should turn
out to be characterized, at an institutional level and even if only in its
control of PR, by a form of control over its rivals that bypasses discussion. It
is no less interesting that, at the same time, mid-century American, speculat-
ive philosophy is trying to get to grips with the apparently irreconcilable
differences between different approaches to philosophy and to do so with
the help of reasoning. This attempt was not only one carried out at the theor-
etical level within the pages of PR and elsewhere, but one that was to some
extent realized in the running of PR and, perhaps, in the tolerance with
which analytic philosophy was treated.
Our account of the takeover of PR and of its effects raises several questions.
One is to what extent our account leaves room for an internalist view of the
emergence of American analytic philosophy and, more broadly, of analytic
philosophy. Our aim has been to identify one strand in this emergence and
we do not here claim to offer anything like a complete account of it. One
could supplement our story with considerations that are similarly external
as well as with accounts based on supposed affinities between some
strands of pragmatism and mid-century analytic philosophy, or supposed rela-
tive merits of mid-century analytic philosophy. One could also, as already
acknowledged, recognize a political dimension to the 1950s story. It is
perhaps, however, premature to consider the extent to which the story of ana-
lytic philosophy should be external or internal. This is partly because of the
relatively limited attention that has been paid to the kind of external expla-
nation we have pursued here. Beyond our examination of the case of PR,
there is (as far as we are aware) only the already noted examination of devel-
opments in Philosophy of Science and our (Katzav and Vaesen, ‘Pluralism and
Peer Review in Philosophy’) examination of the history of Mind, which shows
that what occurred in PR also occurred in Mind, primarily due to editorial
decisions by Moore in the 1920s and by Ryle in the 1950s.
A second question our study raises is how the kind of external account we
have developed might be extended further. Attempts to do so might look at
the development of philosophy teaching programmes, including the Sage
School programme, and of academic societies, such as the APA. As for jour-
nals, the cases of Mind and of PRmay be part of a broader pattern. Of particu-
lar interest is the case of JoP, an initial examination of which suggests that it
quickly came to be dominated by analytic philosophy in the early 1960s.
A third question is what a pattern of institutionalized exclusion would, if
established, say about the nature of analytic philosophy. It would at the
very least suggest that analytic philosophy, in at least some of its most
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prominent phases, endorses implicit forms of exclusion, some of which in fact
might follow from explicitly stated meta-philosophical commitments. Of
course, in order to buttress the idea that exclusion is a feature diagnostic
for some historical phase of analytic philosophy, one would need to
address the objection that available rivals were as sectarian as it was, and
this task entails making comparisons with other approaches to philosophy.
A fourth question is how the way for what occurred at PR was paved.
Answering this question requires considering the earlier (internal and exter-
nal) history of disagreements about methodological pluralism in America.
Possibly significant here is the earlier proposal a group of new realists put
to American philosophers in 1910 for the creation of a shared platform for
American philosophers, one that included shared terminology, methods
and doctrines, and was actively opposed by Cornell philosophers (Jewett,
Science, Democracy, and the American University). One would also, among
other things, have to consider the influence of British philosophy beyond its
influence through the contents of the pages of Mind; analytic philosophy
gained strength in Britain earlier than it did in America and, as is widely recog-
nized, there were strong ties between philosophers in the two countries, with
many American philosophers visiting, or studying at, Cambridge and Oxford
(see the examples given in Section 2.iii) and, accordingly, being exposed to
what were Moore’s and Ryle’s relatively narrow visions of philosophy
(Katzav and Vaesen, ‘Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy’).
Finally, one may consider in more detail how the emphasis of PR’s editors
on certain philosophical approaches and certain individual philosophers
shaped post-1948 American philosophy, including its ways of thinking of
itself. With regard to individuals, for example, it seems that Quine’s 1951 con-
tribution to PR propelled him to international fame (Murphey, The Develop-
ment of Quine’s Philosophy, 81). More broadly, the omissions in PR not only
helped to make extra space for analytic philosophy in America, they may
also have contributed to developing its self-image. Plausibly, the view that
analytic philosophy was just a natural development for American philosophy
required forgetting the speculative alternatives to it or placing them, with
classical pragmatism, in the past. Moreover, once this is done, one is much
closer to thinking of the alternatives to analytic philosophy as being an
affair of continental Europe.
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V. F. Lenzen 54(4),
D. H. Parker 54(5),
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J. Feibleman and
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B. Blanshard 54(4),
E. A. Burtt 54(6),
H. E. Barnes 54(6)
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1946 R. W. Sellars 55(1),
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M. Black 56(3),
E. J. Nelson 56(5),
L. W. Beck 56(6)
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(Continued )
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Continued.
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L. Strauss 61(4), A. S. P.
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W. J. Rees 62(1),
E. A. Burtt 62(1), P. Ziff
62(1), G. Ryle 62(2),
M. Weitz 62(2),
P. B. Rice 62(3),
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62(4)
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